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A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO NUCLEAR 
         NON-PROLIFERATION
Mitsuru Kurosawa*
  The demise of the Cold War was once thought to bring us a very promising future 
with the disappearance of the confrontation between the United States and the former 
Soviet Union as well as the significant progress in nuclear reduction negotiations 
resulting in the START I and START H Treaties. 
  In spite of and/or because of these developments on the global level, new problems 
have emerged on the regional level through new phenomena such as the Persian Gulf 
War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, suspicions over the North Korean nuclear 
program, and various regional or ethnic conflicts. 
  On October 21, 1994, The United States and the Democratic People's Republic of 
Korea(DPRK) agreed to a framework agreement on nuclear issues after the third round 
of high-level negotiations. This is the first step foward resolving the critical issue of 
the two Koreans in view of attaining a denuclearized Peninsula. Although it will take 
much time and money to accomplish this goal, the first step should be praised for 
regional peace and security. 
  Non-proliferation issues have come to the forefront in the post-Cold War era.') For 
example, in his address to the United Nations General Assembly on September 27, 
1993, President Bill Clinton said, "One of our most urgent priorities must be attacking 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, whether they are nuclear, chemical 
or biological; and the ballistic missiles that can rain them down on populations
1)
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hundreds of miles away ....... I have made non-proliferation one of our nation's highest 
priorities. We intend to weave it more deeply into the fabric of all our relationships 
with the world's nations and institutions." 
  As an international effort to respond to this issue, the first UN Security Council 
Summit in January 1992, which discussed anew world order after the Cold War and 
asked the Secretary-General to prepare a report for revitalization of the UN function 
on international peace and security, recognized the vital importance of the problem of 
non-proliferation i  the post-Cold War era. The statement by the Security Council 
President includes the phrase "proliferation of weapons of mass destruction constitutes 
the threat o international peace and security". The phrase comes from Article 39 of 
the UN Charter and this determination f proliferation as a threat to international peace 
and security is the first necessary step toward UN sanctions under Chapter VII of the 
Charter. This is a strong expression of the Security Council against proliferation. 
  In addition, in recent years, there seems to be a tendency to develop new methods 
and instruments, including military ones, for the dominant global powers to impose 
non-proliferation on aspirant nuclear proliferators, as shown in the Iraqi and North 
Korean cases, as well as in the US Defense Counterproliferation Initiative. 
  The NPT review and extension conference will be held in April/May 1995, which 
will give parties to the Treaty a good opportunity not only to review and discuss the 
implementation f the obligations assumed in the Treaty but also to think about broader 
and more fundamental problems like a new international security order. The conference 
is different from the four previous review conferences, as the 1995 conference has to 
decide, by a majority vote, how long the Treaty should be extended. 
  In this paper, I will discuss, first, the ramifications of the1995 review and extension 
conference from the viewpoint of strengthening the NPT regime, and the nuclear 
disarmament measures which should be taken. Second, I will examine the role of the 
IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) and the United Nations Security Council 
in buttressing the NPT regime, taking the Iraqi and North Korean cases as examples. 
Lastly, recent new arguments, including the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative, 
will be studied to show a new tendency in the efforts toward non-proliferation.
I. The Future of the NPT and Nuclear Disarmament
i) The NPT Review and Extension Conference 
  At the previous four review conferences held every five years since 1970, discus-
sions to review the operation of the Treaty have focused on the discriminatory aspects 
of the Treaty and whether and how they have been mitigated, especially in connection
1995] A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION 15
with the implementation of Articles IV and VI. Although every article of the Treaty 
has been the subject of vigorous discussion and every article should be examined on 
its own merits at the next conference, the most controversial nd competing arguments 
have been and will be centered on the implementation f the obligations under Article 
VI. 
  The 1995 conference is not only a review conference but also an extension con-
ference, 2) and parties have to decide how long the Treaty should be extended. No nation 
has a veto on the decision and only a majority of the Parties, which currently means 
84 votes among the 166 parties, can decide the extension. However, it would be 
preferable to extend the Treaty by consensus rather than voting. 
  There are only three options stipulated in Article X, paragraph 2: i) indefinite 
extension, ii) an additional fixed period extension, or iii) additional fixed periods 
extension. The first option is very clear. The second option, which means the expiration 
of the Treaty after the additional period, can not and should not be accepted, because 
of the significant role the NPT regime has been playing for international peace and 
security. The third option is not so clear, and there is no method or procedure stipulated 
to move from the first period to the second or third period. 
  The fourth option, which is not clearly provided for in the article but seems not to 
be excluded, is to have another extension conference ten or twenty-five years later. The 
intention of the treaty drafters was to defer the decision on Treaty duration for 25 years, 
and not to expire the Treaty at that time. 
  At the G-7 Economic Summit held in Naples in July 1994, in its political communi-
que, the participating overnments, including Japan, declared their unequivocal sup-
port for the indefinite xtension of the Treaty in 1995, recognizing that proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction and missiles was one of the most serious threats to 
international peace and security. The previous year, Japan was rather eluctant to join 
in the indefinite xtension at the Summit held in Tokyo. 
  The Japanese official position supporting the indefinite xtension of the NPT was 
proclaimed by Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa in his first policy address on August 
23, 1993, just after the strong criticism of Japan because of its ambiguous attitude at 
the Tokyo Summit. In September 1993, he again made it clear that Japan supported 
the indefinite xtension in his address at the United Nations General Assembly. 
  There is, however, strong opposition against he indefinite xtension of the Treaty
2) See John Simpson and Darryl Howlett, "The NPT Renewal Conference: Stumbling toward 1995," Interna-
    tional Security, Vol.19, No. 1, Summer 1994, pp.47-7 1; George Bunn, Charles N. Van Doren & David Fischer, 
   Options & Opportunities: The NPT Extension Conference of 1995, PPNN Study Two, 1991.
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in Japan. Mayor Hirooka of Hiroshima City, on August 6, 1993 and 1994, clearly stated 
that he was opposed to the indefinite extension, because it would destabilize the 
relationship between NWSs and NNWSs, without making a clear way toward eliminat-
ing all nuclear weapons. His view is also strongly supported by academic groups and 
public opinion in Japan. 
  There are conceptional differences underlying the NPT regime and the extension 
of the Treaty. On the one hand, the NPT is thought o be a prerequisite to proceed 
toward nuclear disarmament. For further nuclear disarmament the NPT should there-
fore be extended indefinitely as nuclear disarmament is possible only on the firm 
commitment to the NPT. On the other hand, the indefinite xtension of the Treaty is 
perceived as a consolidation of the status quo solidifying the clear division between 
NWSs and NNWSs. 
  Those arguments also correspond to the different opinions between those who think 
the NPT is a goal in itself and those who take the NPT regime as only a step toward 
the goal of nuclear disarmament. Those who are opposed to the indefinite xtension 
are afraid that the discriminatory regime will continue forever. 
   A compromise between these two viewpoints should be sought. One example 
would be to extend the Treaty for additional fixed periods, that is, in every 10 to 25 
years the parties to the Treaty would get together to check the progress of nuclear 
disarmament. Unless a simple majority or a two-thirds majority of the parties agree to 
the expiration of the Treaty, the Treaty would continue to be effective. 
  Another compromise would be to take the fourth option, that is, to have another 
extension conference, just the same as the one held in 1995, 10 or 25 years later. 
  The direct linkage of the extension with concrete nuclear disarmament measures 
or a concrete timetable can not be supported from both legal and political points of 
view. This is because it amounts to the amendment of the Treaty provisions, which 
must be subject o more rigid procedures than the majority vote. Politically the NPT 
is too important to be conditioned on these elements.
ii) The Measures for Nuclear Disarmament 
  As a better and practical way, some measures should be taken as soon as possible, 
preferably before the review and extension conference, not only to mitigate the 
discriminatory character of the NPT and to have a more equitable and stabilizing NPT 
regime, but also to create a new international security order in the post-Cold War period 
which de-emphasizes nuclear weapons. 
  The first and most important measure is a comprehensive nuclear test ban (CTB), 
whose negotiation has been under way at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva
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since January 1994. A CTB has a symbolic value as a litmus test on whether NWSs 
have the will to fulfill their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty. This is because 
a CTB is mentioned in the preamble of the NPT. Since the negotiation of the Treaty 
almost all NNWSs have claimed the achievement of a CTB as the most significant 
measure to ameliorate the discriminatory nature of the Treaty. 
  With the positive U.S. attitude to a CTB3) and a constructive negotiation in 
Geneva, 4) the possibility of concluding a CTB treaty is higher than at anytime in history. 
Test ban moratoria have been effective for some years on the United States, the Russian 
Federation, the United Kingdom and France. Only China has been conducting nuclear 
tests, once in 1993 and twice in 1994. China declared that a CTBT should be concluded 
by 1996. This means China will continue testing until 1996. The French position is not 
so fixed because President Mitterrand is to retire next spring. 
  Some problems as to the content of the treaty remain unresolved and it is not sure 
a CTB treaty will be signed, ratified or entered into force before the extension 
conference. China and France do not seem to be eager to have a treaty before the 
conference, but it will be better to complete an imperfect treaty before the conference 
rather than a perfect treaty after that. By an incomplete treaty, I mean a treaty without 
the initial participation of China, France and nuclear threshold countries, as well as a 
treaty without sophisticated verification or other important articles. 
  The second nuclear disarmament measure is a prohibition of the production of 
fissile materials for weapon purposes, usually called a "cut-off", which was proposed 
by President Clinton in September 1993. During the negotiation of the NPT it was 
thought that while a CTB would stop the qualitative nuclear arms race, a cut-off would 
stop the quantitative nuclear arms race. Now, however, these measures are thought to 
also be effective in preventing proliferation, although their original effects would still 
be useful. 
  The United States has stopped producing nuclear materials for weapon purposes 
for years and the Russian Federation has substantially stopped producing them, except 
for a few reactors which simultaneously produce electricity for civilian use but are 
supposed to be closed by 2000. The target of this measure is mainly threshold countries 
outside of the NPT, that is, Israel, India and Pakistan. It aims at freezing the nuclear 
materials for weapon purposes in these countries.
3) See Glenn T.Seaborg and Benjamin S.Loeb, "Approaching a Comprehensive T st Ban: A United States 
    Historical Perspective," Disarmament, Vol.XVI, No.3, 1993, pp.35-55. 
4) See Yoshitomo Tanaka, "Current Prospects for a Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty," Disarmament, 
   Vol.XVI, No.3, 1993, pp.9-13; Lars Norgerg, "Current Efforts to Negotiate a Nuclear Test-Ban," Ibid., 
   pp. 14-17.
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  The measure has a critical shortcoming in that it recognizes a special category for 
those states just between NWSs and NNWSs. In order to strengthen the NPT regime, 
the measure should be recognized as a temporary step toward complete denucleariza-
tion. Otherwise, it would be counterproductive for the regime. 
  These two measures are highly recommendable, because not only are they effective 
measures to stop the nuclear arms race, but they are also non-discriminatory and 
equitable for all parties, irrespective of their status as NWSs or NNWSs.5) Not only 
the obligations but also the verification measures are the same for all parties. NWSs 
will then have to accept full-scope safeguards of the IAEA. 
  The third measure is the implementation f the START I and START II Treaties as 
soon as possible. 6) The Lisbon Protocol to the START I Treaty should be signed and 
ratified as provided for by Ukraine. 7) This means that Ukraine should accede to the 
NPT as a NNWS. It is a precondition for Russia to exchange the instrument of 
ratification of the START I Treaty. Without being entered into force, the content of the 
START I treaty has been implemented in part by the United States and Russia, but it 
should be legally binding, because it is the precondition for the START II Treaty to 
become effective. After Ukraine ratified the NPT, the START I Treaty entered into 
force on December 5, 1994, which also opens a path to the START II Treaty ratifica-
tion. 
  START III negotiations hould be started for the further reduction of strategic 
nuclear forces between the two countries, possibly including the United Kingdom, 
France and China. It may also be necessary to address non-strategic nuclear forces 
which have no legal instrument so far.8) 
  The fourth measure is negative security assurances and a pledge of no-first-use of 
nuclear weapons. The conditions which were attached to each declaration of negative 
security assurances seem to have lost their meaning because of the collapse of the 
Warsaw Treaty Organization and the withdrawal by the U.S. and the Soviet Union/Rus-
5) See Roland Timerbaev, "Strengthening the NPT Regime: A CTBT and a Cut-Off of Fissionable Material," 
   Disarmament, Vol.XVI, No.2, 1993, pp.97-108; George Bunn, Roland M.Timerbaev and JamesF.Leonard, 
   Nuclear Disarmament: How Much Have the Five Nuclear Powers Promised in the Non-Proliferation Treaty? 
   The Lawyers Alliance for World Security, the Committee for National Security and the WashingtonCouncil 
   on Non-Proliferation, June 1994. 
6) See Christoph Bluth, "Strategic Nuclear Weapons and US-Russian Relations: From Confrontation to 
   Co-operative Denuclearization?" Contemporary Security Policy, Vol.15, No.1, April 1994, pp. 80-108. 
7) See Jonathan Samuel Lockwood, "The View from Ukraine: The Aspiring Nuclear Power," Strategic Review, 
    Vol.XXI, No.4, Fall 1993, pp.22-30; F.Stephen Larrabee, "Ukraine: Europe's Next Crisis?" ArmsControl 
   Today, Vol.24, No.6, July/August 1994, pp. 14-19. 
8) See No H.Daalder, "The Role of the Nuclear Powers," Disarmament, VoI.XVI, No.2, 1993, pp.39-50.
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sian Federation of tactical and theater nuclear weapons from other countries. 
  There should be efforts to assume negative security assurances which are uniform, 
with no conditions and legally binding. The measure would give NNWSs an incentive 
to join or keep joining the Treaty, and strengthen the NPT regime because the measure 
would devalue the military and political usefulness of nuclear weapons. In addition, 
by proceeding one step further, NWSs should proclaim individually or collectively a 
no-first-use pledge.9) 
  The fifth measure is the establishment ofnuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) all 
around the world.' 0) These are complementary tothe NPT and are increasingly impor-
tant as a measure to strengthen regional security. The initiative to create a NWFZ surely 
has to come from the countries in a region, but for their success, the cooperation and 
support by NWSs is indispensable. 
  In the Korean Peninsula, the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization i  February 
1992 should be implemented as soon as possible.' 1) The NWSs should give full support 
to the establishment of an African NWFZ which will materialize soon. 12) The protocols 
to the Rarotonga Treaty, which established a nuclear free zone in the South Pacific, 
should be signed and ratified by the United States and the United Kingdom. The U.S. 
should encourage and support he idea of establishing a NWFZ in Southeast Asia. 
  In the Middle East and South Asia, certain progress in the peace process, including 
confidence-building measures, will be necessary before trying to establish aNWFZ.
iii) The Nuclear Posture Review 
  On October 29, 1993, the Defense Secretary of the U.S. Les Aspin announced that 
the Department of Defense planned to conduct he first nuclear policy review in 15
9) Paul Warnke, "Strategic Nuclear Policy and Non-Proliferation," Arms Control Today, V61.24, NoA May 
    1994, p.5; See George Quester and Victor A.Utgoff, "No-First-Use and Nonproliferation: Redefining 
   Extended Deterrence," Washington Quarterly, Vol.17, No.2, Spring 1994, pp. 103-114; Dingli Shen, "roward 
   a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World: A Chinese Perspective," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol.50, No.2, 
   March/April 1994, pp.51-54. 
10) See Helen Leigh-Phippard, "Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones: Problems and Prospects," Arms Control, Vol.14, 
   No.2, August 1993, pp.93-114. 
11) See Tae-Hwan Kwak and Seung-Ho Joo, "The Denuclearization f the Korean Peninsula: Problems and 
   Prospects," Arms Control, Vol.14, No.2, August 1993, pp.65-92; Darryl Howlett, "Nuclearization or 
   Denuclearization the Korean Peninsula," Contemporary Security Policy, Vol.15, No.2, August 1994, 
   pp.174-193. 
12) See Gift Punungwe, "Africa and the International Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime," Disarmament, 
   Vol.XVI, No.2, 1993, pp. 153-170; Jeremy Shearar, "Denuclearization in Africa: The South African Dimen-
    sion," Ibid., pp. 171-185; Ibrahima Sy, "A Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Africa," Disarmament, Vol.XVI, 
   No.3, 1993, pp.92-102.
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years which would include a revision of doctrine, force structure, operations and arms 
control. In light of the end of the Cold War and the growing danger of nuclear 
proliferation, there existed some expectation that the U.S. would proceed to START 
III negotiations for a further cut beyond 3500 and pledge a no-first-use of nuclear 
weapons. 
  A nuclear posture review, which had no major change in key issues from the Bush 
Administration, was announced on September 22, 1994 after a ten month study."' One 
of the two great issues of the Nuclear Posture Review is how to achieve the proper 
balance between leading, that is, providing a leadership for further and continuing 
reductions in nuclear weapons and hedging against a reversal of reform in Russia. The 
other big issue is how to achieve the benefits of improved safety and security for the 
residual force of nuclear weapons both in the United States and in Russia. Accordingly, 
the new posture is said to be no longer based on MAD (Mutual Assured Destruction) 
but on MAS (Mutual Assured Safety). 
  First, in the Nuclear Posture Review which covers the time period up to 2003, the 
U.S. has no will to commit to proceed beyond the START II Treaty for a further cut 
of nuclear weapons below 3500.14 Second, the U.S. will maintain on-strategic nuclear 
forces in Europe as part of its commitment to the alliance, and its commitments oits 
allies are neither changed nor in any way diminished. 
  The former means that there will be no further nuclear reduction egotiations in
the near future, in spite of the argument that now it is good opportunity to de-emphasize 
the role of nuclear weapons by negotiating a further cut, and by starting nuclear 
reduction egotiations among five NWSs. 
  The latter means that the U.S. will not pledge no-first-use of nuclear weapons, 
which is a critical means to reduce the military and political role of nuclear weapons 
in international society.
II. The IAEA and the UN Security Council
  The IAEA, which was established in 1957 after the "atoms for peace" address by 
President Eisenhower, has the double purpose of promoting peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy and preventing their diversion to military uses. Since Article III of the NPT 
asked NNWSs parties to the Treaty to apply IAEA safeguards to their peaceful nuclear
13) 
14)
Defense Department Briefing, Nuclear Posture Review, September 22, 1994. 
See Sven F.Kraemer, "America's Ten Deadly Strategic Gambles: Arms Control or Unilateral Disarmament?" 
Strategic Review, Vol.XXII, No.4, Fall 1994, pp.7-22.
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materials, the IAEA has applied its safeguards by concluding a safeguards agreement 
with each party. 
  In the Cold War era, the focus of safeguards was on industrialized nations, and as 
frequency of the IAEA inspections is determined in accordance with the amount of 
nuclear material of each country, a large part of the IAEA safeguards activities have 
been conducted in the Western European nations, Japan and Canada. In the post-Cold 
War era, the focus of IAEA safeguards has shifted to developing countries like Iraq 
and North Korea.
i) The Iraqi Case and its Lessons 
  The Security Council, on April 3, 1991, adopted Resolution 687, which marked the 
end of the Persian Gulf War and was formally accepted by Iraq. Under this resolution, 
the Security Council invites Iraq to reaffirm unconditionally its obligations under the 
NPT, decides that Iraq shall unconditionally agree not to acquire or develop nuclear 
weapons or nuclear-weapons-usable material, and requests the Director-General of the 
IAEA to carry out immediate on-site inspections of Iraq's nuclear capabilities. 
  The Security Council established a United Nations SpecialCommission (UN-
SCOM) for conducting the inspection and destruction of Iraq's weapons of mass 
destruction, and the IAEA was given a special responsibility with regard to nuclear 
weapons. These inspections were different from usual IAEA inspections because they 
were decided as a mandatory action by the UN under Chapter VII of the Charter. The 
IAEA inspectors enjoyed unconditional and unlimited access to any area, facility, 
record or means of delivery. 
  As a result of these inspections, it was found that Iraq had a significant uranium 
enrichment program and a small-scale plutonium production and separation pro-
gram.' 5) Iraq has been a party to the NPT since 1971 and accepted full-scope safeguards 
of the IAEA. The fact that Iraq had a significant nuclear weapon development program 
at undeclared facilities created great doubt as to the effectiveness of the IAEA 
safeguards and even the effectiveness of the NPT regime. 
  In this context, the Director-General of the IAEA, Hans Blix wrote, "The Iraqi case
15) See Rolf Ekeus, "rhe United Nations Special Commission on Iraq," SIPRI Yearbook 1992: World Armaments 
   and Disarmament, pp.509-524; Rolf Ekeus, "The United Nations Special Commission on Iraq:Activities in 
   1992," SIPRI Yearbook 1993: World Armaments and Disarmament, pp.691-703; Tim Trevan, "UNSCOM: 
   Activities in 1993, " SIPRI Yearbook 1994, pp.739-758; Eric Chauvistre, The Implications of IAEA Inspec-
   tions under the Security Council Resolution 687, UNIDIR Research Papers, No.11, 1992; Benoit Morel, 
   "Nuclear Non-Proliferation and the International Inspection Experience in Iraq," Disarmament, Vol.XVI, 
   No.3, 1993, pp. 103-121.
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opened a new chapter in the world's book of measures to control the further spread of 
nuclear weapons. It called into question the scope and effectiveness of existing 
nonproliferation controls.... The most serious conclusion relating to nonproliferation 
that emerged from the Iraqi case was that it had been possible to hide nuclear material 
and installations ubject o safeguards without detection by the IAEA or by foreign 
intelligence." 16) 
  The Executive Chairman of the UNSCOM, Rolf Ekeus, noting that "we have, with 
Iraq, an instance where a state which has signed and ratified an agreement has blatantly 
violated its obligations. The international community must be prepared to deal with 
such violations. The Treaty in itself is not enough; it must be effectively implemented", 
emphasized the following points: first, special inspections hould be conducted, under 
certain conditions, to sites and activities which have not been declared by a member 
state; second, the Agency's access to information and intelligence from Governments 
should be increased; and third, the Agency's activities hould be more closely linked 
to the Security Council. 17) 
  The first responseto this new situation was the President statement of the UN 
Security Council on January 31, 1992.18) In the statement, he Security Council 
recognized "the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat o 
international peace and security." In addition, "on nuclear proliferation, they note the 
importance of the decision of many countries to adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
and emphasize the integral role in implementation f that Treaty of fully effective IAEA 
safeguards, as well as the importance of effective xport controls. The members of the 
Council will take appropriate measures in the case of any violations notified to them 
by the IAEA." 
  The second response was taken by the IAEA. The Director General and the 
secretariat of the IAEA began to search for measures to strengthen the IAEA safeguards 
based on their bitter experience in the Iraqi case. At the General Conference in 
September 1991, the Director General Hans Blix emphasized the importance of special 
inspections as a measure to strengthen the safeguards system. He also mentioned the
16) Hans Blix, "Verification of Nuclear Nonproliferation: The Lessons of Iraq," Washington Quarterly, Vol.15, 
   No.4, Autumn 1992, p.58. 
17) Rolf Ekeus, "Minimizing the Risk of Proliferation," United Nations, Disarmament Topical Papers 10, 
   Non-Proliferation and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia and the Pacific, 1992, pp.47-48; See David 
   Albright and Mark Hibbs, "Iraq's Quest for the Nuclear Grail: What Can We Learn," Arms Control Today, 
   Vol.22, No.6, July/August 1992, pp.3-1 ; Rolf Ekeus, "The Iraq Experience and the Future of Nuclear 
    Non-Proliferation," Washington Quarterly, Vol.15, No.4, Autumn 1992, pp.67-73. 
18) UN Doc. S/23500, 31 January 1992.
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three conditions that need to be fulfilled to make special inspections effective: i)the 
inspectors must have access to information from sources besides the state in which the 
inspections were to be performed; ii)the inspectors must have a right to timely and 
unrestricted access to any location which, according to credible information, might 
have an undeclared nuclear installation or contain undeclared nuclear material; and 
iii)the Agency may need to exercise its right under the Agency's Statute and relation-
ship agreement with the United Nations to have access to the Security Council, if the 
state in question rejects a request for a special inspection.19) 
  Based on these discussions, the Board of Governors of the IAEA, on February 26, 
1992, reaffirmed the Agency's right to undertake special inspections in Member States 
with comprehensive safeguards agreements, when necessary and appropriate, and to 
ensure that all nuclear materials in peaceful nuclear activities are under safeguards. 
The Board further reaffirmed the Agency's rights to obtain and to have access to 
additional information and locations in accordance with the Agency's Statute and all 
comprehensive safeguards agreements. 20)
ii) The North Korean Case 
  The first case where the lessons from the Iraqi experience were very clearly applied 
was with North Korea. After a long delay and with the end of the Cold War, North 
Korea signed a safeguards agreement with the IAEA on January 30, 1992, which was 
entered into force on April 10. After six ad hoc inspections based on an initial report 
by North Korea, on February 9, 1993 the Director General requested a special inspec-
tion in the DPRK in order to clarify significant inconsistencies in samples and meas-
urements and to gain access to two sites. 21) On February 25, the Board of Governors 
adopted a resolution calling upon the DPRK to respond positively to the Director 
General's request. 22) 
  North Korea, refusing this request, announced its intention to withdraw from the 
NPT on March 12. The Board of Governors, on April 1, found that the DPRK was in 
non-compliance with its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with the Agency,
19) 
20)
21) 
22)
PPNN Newsbrief, No.15, Autumn 1991, p.14. 
IAEA Press Release, PR/92/12, 26 February 1992; See Hans Blix, "IAEA Safeguards: New Challenges," 
Disarmament, Vol. XV, No.2, 1992, pp.41-42; David Fischer, Ben Sanders, Lawrence Scheinman and George 
Bunn, A New Nuclear Triad: The Non-Proliferation ofNuclear Weapons, International Verification and the 
International Atomic Energy Agency, PPNN Study Three, 1992; George Bunn and Roland Timerbaev, 
Nuclear Verification under the NPT.• What Should It Cover -How Far May It Go?, PPNN Study Five, 1994. 
IAEA Press Release, PR/93/4, 16 February 1993. 
IAEA Doc. GOV/2636, 26 February 1993.
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and decided to report he DPRK's non-compliance and the Agency's inability to verify 
non-diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded, to the Security Council 
of the United Nations. 23) 
  Based on the progress of the high level negotiations between the United States and 
North Korea, North Korea announced the suspension of effectuation of its withdrawal 
from the NPT, on June 11, just one day before the day when the withdrawal an-
nouncement would become legally effective. In spite of these temporary improvements 
of the situation, other problems like withdrawing nuclear fuel rods from reactors 
without observation or inspection by the IAEA have arisen, and the nuclear suspicion 
of North Korea could not cleared at all. 
  Facing North Korea's intransigence, members of the Security Council began to 
discuss the possibility of imposing sanctions, 24) and in the middle of June 1994 the 
U.S. delegate to the UN Security Council submitted a draft proposal for sanctions 
against North Korea. The sequence of these events follows what was decided in 1992 
at the IAEA and the UN Security Council based on lessons from the Iraqi case. 
  After the meeting of Jimmy Carter with Kim Il Sung on June 16, both countries 
agreed to start he third round of high level consultations under the condition that North 
Korea freezes its nuclear development. With intensive negotiation and much U.S. 
compromise, the two nations signed "Agreed Framework between the United States 
of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea" on October 21, 1994. 
  The Agreed Framework stipulates; I. Both sides will cooperate to replace the 
DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities with light-water eactor 
(LWR) power plants; II. The two sides will move toward full normalization of political 
and economic relations; III. Both sides will work together for peace and security on a 
nuclear-free Korean Peninsula; and IV. Both sides will work together to strengthen the 
international nuclear non-proliferation regime. 
  In particular, it was agreed that theDPRK would remain a party to the NPT and 
would allow implementation f its safeguards agreement under the Treaty, and that the 
U.S. would provide formal assurances tothe DPRK against the threat or use of nuclear 
weapons by the U.S. With this agreement the non-proliferation regime was kept 
effective on the Korean Peninsula. Although there remain many ambiguities in the 
agreement and it will take long time to implement the agreement, i  should be praised 
as the beginning of the overall resolution of the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula.
23) 
24)
IAEA Doc. GOV/2645, 1 April 1993. 
See Kathleen C.Bailey, "North Korea: Enough Carrots, Time for the Stick," Comparative Strategy, Vol.13, 
No.3, 1994, pp.277-282.
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iii) The Role of the IAEA and the UN Security Council 
  In the post-Cold War era, the IAEA and the UN Security Council have worked hard 
together for the cause of non-proliferation, as shown in the Iraqi and North Korean 
cases. Generally speaking, these new trends should be praised as improving the 
function of the IAEA and the Security Council in order to make the world safer and 
more secure in search for a new international security order. It should be recognized 
that the meaning of non-proliferation has changed in accordance with the changing 
international society. 
  However, these new trends should be understood with the following comments. 25) 
First, although the Iraqi case and North Korean case look similar from the viewpoint 
of non-proliferation or counter-proliferation, the two cases should be separated from 
each other from a legal and factual point of view. In the Iraqi case, the Security Council 
took actions under Chapter VII in face of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, a flagrant violation 
of one of the fundamental rules of international law, while in the North Korean case, 
the IAEA found that the DPRK was in non-compliance with the safeguards agreement 
and the Agency was not able to verify that there had been no diversion. In the former 
case, the IAEA was permitted an unrestricted inspection right, but in the latter case 
inspection depended on the safeguards agreement. 
  Second, in both cases new trends were exercised by the newly revitalized UN 
Security Council, as well as by the strong will of the United States, pursuing `the 
interest of international society' in parallel with `the interest of the United States'. 
Indeed, without he strong support of the United States, the UN Security Council could 
not have worked well. However, for these new trends to be recognized and accepted 
generally as a new international security order in the post-Cold War era, ` the interest 
of international society' must prevail more than that of the United States. 
  Third, regarding access to information based on which a special inspection is to be 
conducted, in the case of North Korea almost all information has come from U.S. 
satellite intelligence. Without the information from the U.S., the IAEA could not have 
asked special inspections of North Korea. However, it would be desirable to collect 
information more objectively and make information collected more reliable. We should 
examine, for example, the possibility of collecting information through multilateral or 
international satellite monitoring. 
  Lastly, at the timeof the NPT conclusion, inspection on undeclared facilities was 
not discussed seriously because no state was thought to have undeclared facilities. As
25) See Eric Shouvistre, "The Future of Nuclear Inspection," Arms Control, Vol.14, No.2, August 1993, pp.23-64; 
    Ryukichi Imai, "NPT Safeguards Today and Tomorrow," Disarmament, Vol.XV, No.2, 1992, pp.47-57.
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one of the critical lessons from the Iraqi case, the IAEA correctly reaffirmed the right 
of special inspections. However, special inspections provided for in the safeguards 
agreement are not the same as the challenge inspection provided for in the Chemical 
Weapons Convention. In order to make the character of special inspection clearer, it is 
necessary to work out a precise procedure for special inspections.
III. Various Approaches to Non-Proliferation
i) The Changing Character of Non-Proliferation 
  The purpose and nature of non-proliferation has been changing since it was estab-
lished. In the 60s and 70s, the target of non-proliferation was western industrialized 
nations uch as West Germany, Japan, Italy and others. In the 70s and 80s, the so-called 
threshold countries uch as Israel, India, Pakistan, South Africa, Argentina and Brazil, 
none of which was a party to the NPT, were the main concern of non-proliferation. 
South Africa acceded to the NPT in 1991, and Argentina and Brazil have already 
accepted full-scope safeguards of the IAEA by bilateral agreement. 26) Argentina has 
also become and Brazil will soon be a party to the Tlatelolco Treaty. 
  In the post-Cold War era in the 90s, rogue or irresponsible countries uch as Iraq 
and North Korea, both of which are parties to the Treaty, and other developing 
countries, as well as traditional threshold countries, Israel, India and Pakistan, are the 
focus of efforts of non-proliferation. 27) 
  In this context, it is strongly argued that the traditional efforts for non-proliferation 
are not enough or not good at all. For example, Mr.Ted Galen Carpenter pointed out: 
"The recent crisis over North Korea's nuclear program is merely the latest evidence 
that the global nonproliferation regime, symbolized by the nuclear Non-proliferation 
Treaty (NPT), is inexorably breaking down."28) Similarly, Mr.Seth Cropsey main-
tained: "the spread of nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them has already 
advanced so far that the important question is no longer how to stop their proliferation, 
but rather how to prevent hem from being used."29)
26) See Julio C.Carasales, "The Non-Proliferation Treaty, Tiatelolco and the Regional Contribution," Disarma-
   ment, Vol.XVI, No.2, 1993, pp.109-122; John R.Redick, "Latin America's Emerging Non-Proliferation 
   Consensus," Arms Control Today, Vol.24, No.2, March 1994, pp.3-7; Jose Goldemberg and Harold 
   A.Feiveson, "Denuclearization in Argentina nd Brazil, " Ibid., pp.8-14. 
27) See W.Seth Carus, "Proliferation and Security in Southwest Asia," Washington Quarterly, Vol.17, No.2, 
   Spring 1994, pp. 129-139. 
28) Ted Galen Carpenter, "Closing the Nuclear Umbrella," Foreign Affairs, Vol.73, No.2, March/April 1994, 
    p.8. 
29) Seth Cropsey, "The Only Credible Deterrent," Foreign Affairs, Vol.73, No.2, March/April 1994, p.14.
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  Under the same perception, Mr. Brad Roberts, claiming that nonproliferation may 
ultimately prove counterproductive as the sole focus of policy in the decades ahead, 
proposed a new concept termed "antiproliferation". He argued: "The nuclear non-
proliferation model of the Cold War years is no longer adequate because it no longer 
encompasses all significant dimensions of the proliferation problem or the full range 
of policy responses. Antiproliferation strategies for the future must look beyond the 
traditional emphasis on denial alone, to include new diplomatic and military elements 
that emphasize coping with a world in which proliferation is slowly progressing, and 
manipulating the balance of incentives and disincentives this process creates for more 
cooperative approaches to problem of international security." 30) 
  He emphasizes the necessity of a comprehensive approachto the problem including 
diplomatic measures to mitigate the incentives of proliferators by pursuing new 
possibilities for regional arms control, as well as military measures to support 
diplomatic efforts including the improvement of U.S. military preparedness and the 
strengthening of the collective security of the United Nations.
ii) Counterproliferation 
  Mr.John Deutch ad already maintained in 1992, that "The United States, preferab-
ly in a multilateral context, should state that any use of nuclear weapons would be 
considered a casus belli and that violation of the NPT would trigger specific sanctions, 
including the possibility of multilateral nd, in exceptional cases, unilateral ction. 
...The United States should maintain military forces appropriate to make such a threat 
credible"31) 
  On December 7,1993 then Secretary ofDefense Les Aspin launched the Defense 
Counterproliferation Initiative.32) It isa response tothe President's address atthe U.N. 
General Assembly, which emphasized a need to attack the proliferation f weapons of
mass destruction. It also takes into account the Pentagon's October 1993 Bottom-Up 
Review in connection with the spread of weapons ofmass destruction (WMD).
30) Brad Roberts, "From Nonproliferation to Antiproliferation," International Security, Vol.18, No.1, Summer 
   1993, p.173. 
31) John M.Deutch, "The New Nuclear Threat," Foreign Affairs, Vol.71, No.4, Fall 1992, p.133; See William 
   H.Lewis and Christopher C.Joyner, "Proliferation of Unconventional Weapons: The Case for Coercive Arms 
    Control," Comparative Strategy, Vol.10, No.4, 1991, pp.299-309; John R.Powers and Joseph E.Muckerman, 
    "Rethink the Nuclear Threat," Orbis, Vol.38, No.1, Winter 1994, pp.99-108. 
32) "Nuclear Proliferation Foremost Among 4 Chief Threats for U.S.," USIA Wireless File, December 7, 1993, 
   pp.4-7; See Marc Dean Millot, "Facing the Emerging Reality of Regional Nuclear Adversaries," Washington 
    Quarterly, Vol.17, No.3, Summer 1994, pp.41-71.
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  In addition to the traditional emphasis on prevention, the Counterproliferation 
Initiative adds protection as a major policy goal. Therefore, at the heart of the Initiative 
is a drive to develop new military capabilities to deal with this new threat. The stated 
goals of U.S. counterproliferation doctrine are: (1) to deter countries from acquiring 
WMD, (2) to reverse WMD programs diplomatically where proliferation has occurred, 
(3) to protect U.S. interests, forces, and allies from the use and effects of WMD by 
ensuring that the U.S. has the equipment, intelligence capability, and strategy to deter 
the threat or use of WMD against U.S. and allied forces in the event of a conflict, and 
if necessary, (4) to defeat an adversary armed with WMD 33) 
  Under the new Initiative,34) in addition to traditional"prevention" measures like 
dissuasion, denial, arms control and international pressure, new "protection" measures 
with four subcategories labelled defusing, deterrence, offense and defense, are ex-
plained in detail. As a military response to proliferation, the emphasis in offense is the 
ability to hunt mobile time sensitive targets and to attack buried targets, and in defense, 
the use of theater missile defenses. 35)
iii) A Comprehensive Approach to Non-Proliferation 
  In order to cope with these recent developments in the post-Cold War era, it is 
necessary to take a comprehensive approach to the problem of proliferation. A com-
prehensive approach may include: i) the measures which states willingly take for 
non-proliferation, i cluding participation i the NPT or NWFZ treaty, and which would 
give incentives for states to join the non-proliferation regime, such as providing 
security assurances or reducing nuclear weapons of the NWSs; ii) measures which 
technically prevent states from getting nuclear-related items, such as export control or 
technical denial by the Nuclear Exporters' Group, the Australian Group or the MTCR 
(Missile Technology Control Regime); and iii) measures which forcefully destroy their 
nuclear capacity by military tools such as those implied in the Defense 
Counterproliferation Initiative.
33) Zachary S.Davis, U.S. Counterproliferation Doctrine: Issues for Congress, CRS, Library of Congress, 
   September 21, 1994. 
34) Les Aspin, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report o the President and the Congress, January 1994, pp.34-41. 
35) See Keith B.Payne, "Proliferation, Deterrence, Stability and Missile Defense," Comparative Strategy, 
   Vol.13, No, 1, 1994, pp. 117-129; Spurgeon M.Keeny, Jr., "The Theater Missile Defense Threat o U.S. 
   Security," Arms Control Today, Vol.24, No.7, September 1994, pp.3-7: Jack Mendelsohn and John 
   B.Rhinelander, "Shooting Down the ABM Treaty," Ibid., pp.8-10; John Pike, "Theater Missile Defense 
   Programs: Status and Prospects," Ibid., pp. 11-14; David Nosher and Raymond Hall, "The ClintonPlan for 
   Theater Missile Defenses: Costs and Alternatives," Ibid., pp. 15-20.
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  In a few very rare cases it might be necessary to invoke the third measures, 
including the use of military means, and this would resolve the problem only tem-
porarily. Even if the third measures are employed, it would be necessary to react 
collectively under the auspice of the United Nations rather than unilaterally by one 
state. 
  The second measures of export control are necessary but not sufficient o prevent 
the spread of nuclear-related materials or technology. They have been playing a role 
in non-proliferation by making the availability of such materials and technology more 
difficult and time-consuming. However, they can not resolve the fundamental problem 
and sometimes have a counterproductive effect by exposing the North-South dis-
crimination. 
  The first measures which ask states voluntarily to join the NPT or NWFZ treaty 
should be a central means for non-proliferation. In order to promote accession or 
participation in these legal instruments, they must be more equitable and non-dis-
criminatory. As a CTB treaty and a cut-off treaty are more equitable and less dis-
criminatory than the NPT, they should be pursued to buttress the non-proliferation 
regime. Other measures such as a negative security assurances agreement or no-first-
use pledge will strengthen the non-proliferation regime by ameliorating the dis-
criminatory character of the current regime. 
  As each country opposed to joining the regime has its own particular security or 
political reasons, efforts should be directed toward these particular easons to resolve 
the fundamental problems. In parallel with the above-mentioned universal approach, 
a regional approach which is designed by taking into account particular conditions of 
the region and tailored for its particular needs should be sought. 36) 
  In order to establish a new international security order which will be recognized 
and accepted by almost all members of the international society, it should depend on 
each member's political will, rather than the enforcement by some militarily strong 
states.
36) See Gerald M.Steinberg, "Non-Proliferation: Time for Regional Approach?" Orbis, Vol.38, No.3, Summer 
   1994, pp.409-423.
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